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Having Social Practices in Mind. 




1 As Wittgenstein says in a well-known paragraph of the Investigations,  commenting St.
Augustine’s question on time, it belongs to the “essence” of a philosophical inquiry that
“we do not seek to learn anything new by it,”  only to “understand something that is
already  in  plain  view”:  philosophy  deals  with  what  is  already  known,  but  somehow
forgotten, something, therefore, “that we need to remind ourselves of” (PI, § 89). Thus, if
there is something new in philosophy, it is not, as in science, a discovery going beyond
evident and common experience, but the rediscovery of “the phenomena of everyday,” as
St.  Augustine  says  in  a  passage  quoted  by  Wittgenstein  later:  “Manifestatissima  et
usitatissima sunt, et eadem rursus nimis latent, et nova est inventio eorum” (PI, § 436). Like an
orator, the philosopher must find out the metaphorical language capable of shedding a
new light on common places, thus making the forgotten evidence of ordinary phenomena
shining again.  If  this  is the task Wittgenstein assigned to philosophy,  I  think he has
fulfilled  it,  first  and  foremost,  by  developing  a  language  that  opens  us  to  a  new
understanding  of  what  we  are.  Indeed,  presupposed  by  and  developed  through  all  his
grammatical  remarks,  removing our  philosophical  prejudices  on a  given topic,  lies  a
fundamental image calling back to mind what it means and is needed for us to have a
mind at all. Since we all spontaneously are, in our reflective attitudes toward ourselves,
awfully Cartesians, even when we think we are empiricists, Wittgenstein’s new image can
be summed up by two major shifts. The first is a move from internal, mental cognition to
external,  expressive action,  whether linguistic or not.  The second is a move from an
isolated,  self-sufficient  individual  to  a  related,  essentially  dependent  member  of  a
community. Putting these two moves together, we could say that Wittgenstein tried to
remind  us  that  we  owe  what  we  are  to  the  existence  of  social  practices.  It  is  this
anthropological perspective, lying at the heart of his second philosophy, which becomes
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fully  explicit  in  On  Certainty:  there  Wittgenstein  finally  acknowledges,  somewhat
bewildered, that, by stressing the primacy of socially instituted action as the entry and
basis  of  language  games,  he  is  putting  forward  a  perspective  “that  sounds  like
pragmatism” (OC, § 422). The aim of this paper is to clarify what, if anything, sounds like
“pragmatism” in Wittgenstein’s conception of mind and meaning as being grounded in
social practices.
2 To this end, I will not look backward at the criteria of use fixed by the inventor of the
word, C. S. Peirce, or by his immediate followers, James and Dewey,1 but rather replace
Wittgenstein’s  animating  idea  in  the  context  of  contemporary  debates,  which  are
reshaping the very meaning of ‘pragmatism.’ I will focus, in particular, on R. Brandom’s
attempt to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophy as belonging to an intellectual tradition
from which his own rationalist pragmatism should be seen as deriving. Indeed, by so
distinguishing  a  broad  pragmatist  framework  from  the  narrower  instrumentalist
perspective of the American founders, Brandom frees the way for an analysis in which
Wittgenstein’s own pragmatism can be properly understood.2 Instead of looking for local
comparisons with the specific tactics of classical pragmatism, which requires endorsing
Darwinian  naturalism,  seeing  beliefs  as  effective  means  to  successful  action,  while
thinking of meaning as being fixed in the experimental context of a fallibilist inquiry,
Brandom outlines a more general theoretical strategy, which consists in taking ‘discursive
intentionality’ as springing from a more basic form of ‘practical intentionality’: the later
Wittgenstein  and  the  early  Heidegger  would  belong,  together  with  Dewey,  to  this
‘fundamental  pragmatism,’  which found in  Kant  one of  its  first  expressions.3 In  this
general theoretical framework differences can further be explained as ways of accounting
for the primordial practical intentionality, according to whether it refers to purposive
instrumental action or to expressive, socially instituted interaction, language itself being
either  a  useful  tool  for  survival  or  the  paradigmatic  form  of  a  socially  instituted
expressive interaction. 
3 Brandom’s re-appropriation of Wittgenstein’s fundamental pragmatism focuses, in the
opening pages of Making It Explicit, on a close reading of the rule-following argument. This
is where a critical confrontation should take place, which can help us pointing out the
specific  tactics  of  Wittgenstein’s  pragmatism.  Indeed,  if  Brandom’s  reading  clarifies
Wittgenstein’s central idea of social practices, by making the structure of the argument
explicit  and  by  developing  its  consequences  through  a  systematic  discussion  of  its
possible  developments,  it  must  be  admitted,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  rationalist
pragmatism  he  elaborates  on  this  basis  deeply  departs  from  Wittgenstein’s  own
pragmatist perspective.  This is because Brandom’s reading is ultimately rooted in his
commitment toward the rationalist tradition of German idealism, which he now sees as
the true origin of American pragmatism to which we should return: thus, just as Sellars
used Wittgenstein to answer to some of peculiar problems of the rationalist tradition,4
Brandom  takes  up  Wittgenstein’s  conception  of  social  practices  to  socialize  Kantian
philosophy of mind, embracing, as a result, a renewed Hegelian philosophy. This is the
perspective of  Brandom’s  reading:  his  discussion of  the rule-following argument is  a
dialogue between Kant and Wittgenstein whose result must be Hegel, at least his own
reading  of  Hegelian  idealism.  Bearing  in  mind  Brandom’s  formula  –Kant
+Wittgenstein=Hegel – his whole strategy can be reduced to one single argument, which
will give us the right point of entry for a critical confrontation with Wittgenstein. The
argument is the following:
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1: Concepts express rules. (This is Wittgenstein after Kant);
2: Rules express normative social practices. (This is Kant after Wittgenstein);
3: Concepts express normative social practices. (This is Hegel, in Brandom’s reading).
4 The  conclusion  of  the  argument  is  the  starting  point of  Brandom’s  rationalist
pragmatism,  according  to  which  the  game  of  giving  and  asking  for  reasons  is  the
normative social practice that articulates concepts. If we want to resist this rationalist
conclusion and rediscover Wittgenstein’s pragmatism understanding of what we are, we
must  critically  examine  the  two  premises.  McDowell  has  recently  argued,  from  a
supposedly Wittgensteinian perspective, against Brandom’s reconstruction of the rule-
following argument, whose conclusion is stated in the second premise: thus, I will first
present,  discuss  and defend Brandom’s reading,  trying to explain why his  discussion
offers us an interesting philosophical contribution which enables us to understand the
meaning and justification of Wittgenstein’s animating idea of social practices. Following
some key suggestions of V. Descombes, I will then argue that it is rather the very Kantian
framework,  grounding  Brandom’s  as  well  as  McDowell’s  understanding  of  the  first
premise, which should be rejected, since it is indifferent to the difference of normative
vocabularies  that  Wittgenstein  constantly  underlined  in  order  to  articulate  the
irreducibility of grammatical rules. Having questioned the continuity between Kant and
Wittgenstein,  I  will  be  able  to  conclude  by  uncovering  the  structural  features  of
Wittgenstein’s anthropological pragmatism. 
 
Rules Express Normative Social Practices: Brandom’s
Reading of Wittgenstein’s Argument
The Structure of the Argument
In order to see how Brandom reconstructs the whole discussion on rule-following, it is
useful to start at the end, by a sketchy description of the very phenomenon which is
supposed to be there, under our eyes, in the manifest light of everyday life, if it was not
obscured by bad philosophical theorizing that must be refuted to understand it fully. Let
us take Wittgenstein’s example: while driving in the street, we have no doubts about the
way indicated by a sign-post (See PI, § 85). The somewhat puzzling aspect of what would
otherwise seem to be a perfectly obvious phenomenon is that we spontaneously follow
what  has  nonetheless  to  be  taken  as  a  rule:  the  very  possibility  of  describing  our
intentional action presupposes both a distinction between what the rule says and what
we actually do, on one side, and our effective capacity to follow it, on the other. The
starting phenomenon has, therefore, these two constitutive dimensions:5
- Practical-psychological dimension: the rule governs our behavior effectively, through
our understanding of it. 
-  Prescriptive-epistemic  dimension:  the  rule  dictates  the  following  step  and  it  is  by
reference to the rule that we justify our step as the right one. 
5 According  to  Brandom,  the  melody  of  Wittgenstein’s  argument  follows  this  theme:
philosophical theories, trying to explain the original phenomenon of rule-following, give an
account of only one side of it, while we have to explain both. This is why Brandom focuses
on two opposed perspectives. The first is too much struck by the prescriptive nature of
rules: regulism is the general philosophical perspective according to which explicit rules,
intellectually grasped, govern our intentional behavior. Wittgenstein helps us refuting it
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through a regress argument, showing that, unless one already knows how to apply a rule
correctly, a regress opens up, concerning the right application of the rule telling us which
is the right step to make. This argument shows the immediately practical side of rule-
following.  The second philosophical  account is  then too much struck by the practical
nature of rules: regularism is the general philosophical perspective according to which
rules  are  nothing  but  generalized  regularities  read  off  from  our  actual  behavior.
Wittgenstein helps us refuting it through the gerrymandering argument, showing that a
normative rule cannot be derived from a set of observed regularities since any sequence
of steps can be read retrospectively as following a given rule. This argument shows the
necessary prescriptive side of practical rule-following, which cannot be accounted for
without  seeing  its  social  nature.  Hence,  the  idea  of  social practices  as  the  result  of
Wittgenstein’s  critical  refutation  of  traditional  accounts.  To  discuss  the  details  of
Brandom’s reconstruction, and to see if and how he understands Wittgenstein, it is useful
to start by answering to McDowell’s objections. 
 
Against Regulism
6 According to McDowell, Brandom would have missed the whole point of Wittgenstein’s
argument: throughout the discussion on rule-following, there would be not two but “only
one master argument,” showing the bad consequences of the “temptation” to open a
“conceptual  gap between the expression of  a  rule  and performances that  are up for
assessment according to whether or not they conform to the rule” (2009: 108-10). The
problem would not be the rules’ explicit nature but the fact that they are signs which,
unless one already understands them, would need an extra meaning-giving interpretation
opening a disastrous regress of interpretations. Beyond the regress of interpretations,
Wittgenstein  would  therefore  rediscover  the  immediate  understanding  of  signs.
According to McDowell, the argument ends here. Regulism is “simply irrelevant” (2009:
99)  to  Wittgenstein’s  reflections  on  rule-following,  since  “nothing  is  done,”  in  his
philosophy, to conceive “a level of normativity below that at which correctness can be
conceived as  conformity  to  rules”  (2009:  110).  Now,  despite  the  existence of  a  more
fundamental regress of signs, which occurs elsewhere in Wittgenstein, for instance in the
Blue Book,6 it is enough to go back to one the first movement in the rule-following sonata
to see why these two claims are simply wrong. 
7 In § 81 we find a seminal discussion on the normative nature of language. Commenting
Ramsey’s assertion on logic as a normative science, Wittgenstein explains it through the
game comparison. In philosophy “we often compare the use of words with games and
calculi  which have fixed rules”:  the problem is how to keep the idea of  a normative
dimension  in  language,  linked  to  logic,  without  saying  that  our  languages  only
“approximate” an “ideal language”; the only way out is to try to understand understanding:
“For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if
anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according
to definite rules” (PI, § 81). Wittgenstein wants, therefore, to free us from the idea of
understanding as following fixed, definite rules. This is why he asks: “What do I call ‘the
rule by which he proceeds?” (PI, § 82). He distinguishes, then, three kinds of rules. The first
kind is the rule conceived as a “hypothesis” explaining regular observed behavior, while
the second is the one an individual “looks up when he uses signs” or “the one which he
gives us in reply if we ask what his rule is”: if the first is the rule as regularity, the second
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is the explicit rule;  but Wittgenstein is interested in the possibility of not finding an
answer, either through “observation” or by “question”: the problem is then to know what
“meaning” the expression “the rule by which he proceeds” (PI § 82) could still have. Now,
the very point of the “analogy between games and language” is to “throw light” (§ 83) on
this problem of a more than regular, norm-governed behavior, yet not entirely covered
by explicit rules. Thinking of language through the language-game metaphor helps us
seeing that “the application of word is not everywhere bounded by rules” (PI, § 84). Here
“rules” must mean explicit, that is, fixed and definite, rules. This is why we find here a
first formulation of the regress argument, taken up by Brandom: “But what does a game
look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? […] Can’t we imagine a rule determining
the application of a rule, and a doubt which it removes – and so on?” (PI, § 84).7 This is the
point from which Wittgenstein comes to the concrete metaphor of the sign-post, saying:
“A rule stands there like a sign-post” (PI, § 85). Wittgenstein wants here to make clear
that normative behavior should be conceived first with this example in mind. We know
how to deal with a sign-post,  despite the fact that a lot of questions could be asked,
questions concerning even its meaning, this is why he asks: “But where is it said which
way I am to follow it” (PI, § 85)? A simple, spontaneous answer could be: in the rules of
the road, in the same way as the meaning of the king in chess is fixed “in the list of the
rules of the game” (PI, § 197). There is no philosophical account in this answer, because
there is no philosophical problem to answer to. The philosophical debate starts when,
forgetting our know-how,  we start  thinking to rule-following exclusively in terms of
following  an  explicit  rule.  This  is  regulism.  As  Brandom  says,  it  is  against  this
“intellectualist, Platonist conception of norms” according to which “to asses correctness
is always to make at least implicit reference to a rule or principle that determines what is
correct by explicitly saying so” that Wittgenstein’s regress of application argument is
directed: it shows that “explicit rules do not form an autonomous stratum of normative
statuses,” but “rest on properties governed by practice” (1994: 20). The point is not one of
reduction,  but  of  conceptual  priority:  “Norms  that  are  explicit in  the  form  of  rules
presuppose norms that are implicit in practices” (ibid.). 
 
Understanding Practical Understanding
8 The conclusion of the first part of the argument can be stated as follows: to have the
prescriptive side of a rule, one must first acknowledge its internal link with practice.
Thus, even if there are explicit rules codifying signs, as with chess rules, the connection
between rules and actions, as Wittgenstein says, cannot be made unless one adds “the
day-to-day practice of playing” (PI, § 197).8 Knowing a rule is the practical understanding
which consists in knowing how to follow it. This is what Wittgenstein means when he says
that “the grammar of the word ‘knows’ is evidently closely related to that of ‘can’, ‘is able
to.’ But also closely related to that of ‘understands.’ (‘Mastery’ of a technique)” (PI, § 150).
Here lies a first pragmatist commitment in Wittgenstein’s picture. We cannot stop here,
however, since a problem remains: how should we conceive, indeed, the relation between
the actual behavior and the rule, if the latter has to preserve its prescriptive nature? 
9 According to McDowell, Wittgenstein has an answer to this question. Yet, since, according
to his reading, there is only one master argument, he can state it only as a supposed
evidence:  “Of course the practice with sign-post is  essentially norm-involving” (2009:
105). Actual understanding is not, therefore, a “mere uncomprehending disposition to
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react to what are in fact sign-posts in ‘appropriate’ ways” (2009: 101). Furthermore, when
we ask how practice can be normative in this way, McDowell answers once again with a
supposed evidence: “Of course not everyone who encounters a sign-post gets told which
way  to  go.  Sign-posts  do  not  speak  to  those  who  are  not  party  to  the  relevant
conventions” (2009: 101). McDowell makes, therefore, two related, although unwarranted,
steps after the first conclusion of the rule-following argument: practice is normative and it
is normative because it is social. Now, if this has to be Wittgenstein’s image, it might be
interesting to know why. After all, one has only to think to those who argued, like Kripke,
that practice is social, but for this very reason not normative, and those who answered
him by saying that practice is normative, but for this very reason not social. Brandom’s
discussion of regularism can be helpful here, since it shows, against these two readings,
the necessity of the two steps that McDowell invites us to make without giving us good
reasons to do it.
 
Against Regularism
10 Regularism resolves the problem of the relation between actual behavior and rules by
thinking of rules as hypothesis read off from actual behavior, according to the first of the
three  conceptions  of  rules  that  Wittgenstein  discusses  in  § 82  we  have  seen  above.
Brandom develops it through a reading of Sellars, who elaborated a scenario we already
find in Wittgenstein: “we say that [a game] is played according to such-and-such rules
because an observer can read these rules off from the practice of the game – like a natural
law governing the  game” (§ 54)9.  In  this  framework we have,  on one  side,  an agent
displaying regularities in behavior with the aid of the relevant dispositions, and, on the
other,  an  observer,  trying  to  extract  the  rules  to  which  the  agents  is  implicitly
conforming to.  Now, what Brandom labels the gerrymandering argument, taken from
Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein,10 is the inevitable consequence of the confusion between
norms and laws implicitly pointed out by Wittgenstein. Indeed, once we presuppose that
rules  are  explanatory  hypothesis,  not  only  nothing  can prevent  us  but  we  are  even
obliged to modify previously made generalizations in light of new behavior, in such a way
that there is no more any way of distinguishing between correct and incorrect actual
behavior.  Rules as explanatory hypothesis describe natural dispositions, while we were
looking for rules governing normative dispositions. 
11 The fundamental lesson is,  according to Brandom, a Kantian one:  “Kant takes it  that
everything in nature happens according to rules. Being subject to rules is not special to us
[…] What is distinctive about us is the way in which we are subject to norms (for Kant in
the form of rules). As natural beings we act according to rules. As rational beings, we act
according  to  our  conceptions of  rules”  (1994:  30).  This  is  a  general  point  about  the
normative nature of  intentional  behavior  that  Wittgenstein has  inherited from Kant,
through  Frege,  while  helping  us  overcoming  Kant’s  fixation  on  explicit  rules.11 The
problem is therefore to see how our own representations can single out regularities as the
normatively relevant ones, so as to make a distinction, at the level of practice, between
what happens and what ought to happen. To put the point in Wittgenstein’s own words, we
need to understand how a “practice” can be a way of “grasping a rule” (PI, §§ 201-2). In
order to find an answer, we must follow the question Wittgenstein asks himself after
having imagined the possibility of an observer extracting the rule from actual behavior:
“how does the observer distinguish […] between players’ mistakes and correct play?” (PI,
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§ 54). This is the question we have to answer if we want to give a prescriptive force to the
rules emerging from actual behavior.
 
From Individual Behavior to Social Practice
12 A first  strategy  would  be  to  take  Wittgenstein’s  own suggestion seriously:  there  are
“characteristic signs” of the normative distinction between behavior and norm “in the
players’ behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting a slip of tongue”
(PI,  § 54).  Although Brandom consecrates  only  a  footnote  to  such  a  perspective,12 it
deserves to be discussed in detail, since this is what Hacker and Baker think Wittgenstein
was  after.  According  to  their  reading,  if  we  add  self-correcting  behavior  to  actual
behavior we have, as they say, “regularities of action complex enough to produce norms.”
13 Self-correcting behavior would be, therefore, the only missing element to bridge the
gap between rule and behavior: through it, an agent would prove his sensitivity to norms,
rules being the objective dimension hidden in his complex actual behavior. Wittgenstein
would not endorse, therefore, social readings of practices: what we have here is public
evaluable behavior, but an isolated individual, like Robinson Crusoe, could do this all by
himself.  The  problem  of  this  answer  is  that  it  smuggles  a  fundamental  normative
distinction into an account that it is supposed to be free of it. Indeed, for observed regular
behavior to produce norms one needs to conceive the self-correcting behavior as more
than mere self-observation, otherwise the gerrymandering problem occurs again at the
level  of  self-correction,  which  itself  open  to  an  evaluation.  Self-correction  must  be,
therefore, the manifestation of judging oneself in light of a previously given norm: the
right couple, so to speak, is not that of an agent and an observer, but that of an agent and
a judge. Now, unless we go back to regulism, thinking that the agent has access, when
judging, to a pre-established rule containing all its applications, we have to think of self-
correcting  behavior  as  the  manifestation  of  a  practical  sanctioning  disposition
interiorized from an external, previously existing, social relation. 
13 This is why Brandom moves directly toward theories that reconstruct Kant’s distinction
between rules as natural laws and rules as conceived norms in the frame of a “social
theory,” by appealing to the “distinction of perspective between assessing a performance
and producing a performance” (1994: 37). A first step in this direction is J. Haugeland’s
heideggerian  analysis  of  Wittgenstein.14 For  Haugeland,  norms  are  constituted  and
manifested  in  the  difference  between  the  dispositions  to  act  of  an  agent  and  the
dispositions to sanction of  a judge:  “Haugeland’s  censorious herd animals shape each
other’s behavior by their capacity not only to perform but to censure performance. Each
animal in the community that is thereby constituted may […] be able to do both, but as he
conceives it, each act of censure involves two organisms, the censuring and the censured”
(1994:  37).  The naturalistic  vocabulary is  there to show that  the distributed complex
behavior is supposed to engender norms without already presupposing explicit rules: the
distinction  between what  is  done  and  what  ought  to  be  done  is,  therefore,  entirely
dependent upon the dispositions to sanction, which are supposed to manifest sensitivity to
norms as such. This perspective does not go, however, deep enough. Indeed, as Brandom
points out, since “assessing, sanctioning, is itself something that can be done correctly or
incorrectly,” one has to make room for the difference between “actually being punished”
and “deserving to be punished” (1994: 36). This means that the assessor puts forward, by
sanctioning, a claim to authority: sanction, far from establishing authority, presupposes it.
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14 We have to move, therefore, to what Brandom acknowledges as a “more robust” theory of
social practices: the authority of the assessor, far from producing common norms, rests
upon the authority of a “communal assessment” (1994: 37). As a matter of fact, this is where
Wittgenstein, pace Hacker and Baker, wanted to lead us. Norms cannot be conceived unless
they  are  common  (See  PI,  §§ 198,  199):  from  a  grammatical  point  of  view,  we  can
indifferently use, as Wittgenstein does very often, “understanding a sign,” “using it as we
always use it” and “having being taught to use it in such a way” (PI, § 190). Here we have a
conceptual  network  which  throws  light  on  the  original  phenomenon  of  normative
intentional behavior, conceived as expressive action following a social practice after a
training period. Wittgenstein thought that this rediscovery of the ordinary was all that
philosophy,  as  a  dialectical  refutation  of  bad  theorizing,  should  do.  Having  another
conception  of  philosophy,  Brandom  thinks  the  phenomenon  is  not  yet  fully
understandable.
 
The Internal Structure of Social Practices
Indeed, the move to a community view, despite its necessity, is ever more demanding,
since  we  are  now explaining  norms  through  normative  notions.  On  the  side  of  the
assessed,  we  have  the  problem of  “community  membership,”  which is  a  “normative
status”:  here  the  circularity  is  evident,  since  we  explain  why  someone  has  to  do
something in some circumstances by saying that, being a member of the community, he “
ought to conform to the norms implicit in the practice of the community” (1994: 39). On
the side of the assessors, we have the problem of who is entitled to the authority claim:
leaving aside the meaningless solution of the Community as a possible assessor, we face
the problem of “experts,” those who have “the authority to speak for the community”
(1994: 39). Once again this is a normative status, so we are obliged to make “a distinction
between  actually  assessing  and  being  entitled  to  assess”  (1994:  39-40).  This  twofold
problem  shows  that  the  reference  to  the  community  only  shifts  the  problem:  the
structure of social practices, based on the “distinction of normative statuses” between
“the experts, the ones who have authority” and “those who are subject to that authority”
(1994: 39-40), needs to be accounted for. 
Thus, if  Brandom criticizes the “orienting mistake” of “treating I-We relations rather
than I-Thou relations as the fundamental social structure,” it is not because it would be a
mistake to develop a community view, but because we need substantive theorizing to
understand what it means for a community to be there in the first place: now, privileging
I-We relation only make us think that there is something other than individuals – The
Community – making assessments, whereas “assessing, endorsing, and so on are all things
we individuals do and attribute to each other, thereby constituting a community, a ‘we’”
(1994: 39). This is where Brandom starts developing a Hegelian perspective. Indeed, at the
bottom of the mutual attributions that constitute norms lies the very normative structure
making these attributions possible:for common norms to be there in social practices, we
need first to think of the attitude of attributing authority, while taking the responsibility to
act,  and the attitude of attributing responsibility,  while taking the authority to judge.  As
Brandom explained in a  later  essay,  this  is,  in his view,  the “reciprocal  structure of
authority  and  responsibility”  that  Hegel  put  forward  under  the  heading  of  “mutual
recognition.”15 It is through this Hegelian conceptual framework that Brandom tries to
clarify the  social  institution of  conceptual  norms,  that  is,  the possibility for concepts,  as
socially  instituted  norms,  to  incorporate  nonetheless,  in  and  by  their  historical
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development,  an objective  commitment.  Despite  the  relevance of  this  possible  socio-
historical  Hegelian  development  of  Wittgenstein,  however,  Brandom’s  philosophical
edifice rests on some questionable presuppositions, due to the narrow Kantian way in
which he understands conceptual norms themselves. 
 
Concepts Express Rules: Some Wittgensteinian
Objections to Brandom’s Rationalism 
Brandom’s Narrow Kantian Framework
15 The whole discussion on rule-following is framed by a general point that Brandom makes
in some introductory pages about the normative nature of concepts considered as Kant’s
main  contribution  to  philosophy.  After  Kant,  he  says,  the  mental  has  not  to  be
understood, as with Descartes, around the ontological distinction with the physical, but
around a deontological distinction with the causal. What thus characterizes us as knowers
and agents is our capacity to add conceptual rules to given regularities, whether to know
natural necessities or to act upon moral necessities. Understanding this point requires,
accordingly,  understanding  the  peculiar  Kantian  idea  of  necessity  (Notwendikgeit).  As
Brandom says, the “nature and significance of the sea change from Cartesian certainty to
Kantian necessity will be misunderstood unless it is kept in mind that by ‘necessary’ Kant
means  ‘in  accord  with  a  rule’”:  the  Kantian,  proto-pragmatist  commitment  to  the
“primacy of the practical” for cognitive and practical activity can be understood only by
seeing that the “key concept of both is obligation by a rule” in the sense articulated by
the “deontic modality of commitment and entitlement, rather than the alethic modality
of necessity and possibility” (1994: 10). Further philosophical thought would have only
made this Kantian point more clearly by developing the two constitutive dimensions of
concepts, truth and inference. Thus, while acknowledging that Wittgenstein developed an
original  reflection  on  “the  nature  of  norms,”  Brandom  explains  it  by  making  and
remaking the same Kantian point: “Many of his [Wittgenstein’s] most characteristic lines
of thought are explorations of the inaptness of thinking of the normative ‘force’ which
determines how it would be appropriate to act on the model of a special kind of causal
force” (1994: 14). From this point of view, Brandom is naturally led to read Wittgenstein’s
question “How am I able to obey a rule?” (PI, § 217) in the following way: “it is a question
about what actions accord with the rule, are obliged or permitted by it, rather than with
what my grasp of it actually makes me do” (1994: 15).
16 The problem of such a Kantian translation of Wittgenstein’s question is easy to miss, since
Brandom constantly makes a double move, while believing he is only making one. For, on
one side, he is putting forward the very general distinction we saw at work above in the
criticism of regularism: to think about a norm, of whatever kind, as opposed to mere
regularities, one has to make a distinction between what happens and what must happen
according to the rule. Yet in thinking about what must happen, Brandom endorses, at the
same time, the moral-legal framework that Kant inherited from modern thought.16 Thus, he
explains the distinction between “the force of causal ‘must’s’ and “the force of logical or
rational ‘must’s’” invoked by Wittgenstein by reducing it to this more specific framework,
in which the “government by norms” essentially requires “the possibility of mistakes, of
those subjects to norms going wrong, failing to do what they are obliged by those norms
to do”: thus, whereas attributions of natural laws are “incompatible” with the idea of not
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conforming  to  them,  attribution  of  norms  requires,  according  to  Brandom,  “leaving
room” for “mistakes and failures,” this being “one of the essential distinguishing features
of the ‘ought’s’ that express government by norms” (1994: 30-31, I emphasize). It is clear
enough  that  despite  its  supposed  generality,  Brandom’s  distinction  refers to  norms
capable of sorting out behavior as appropriate or inappropriate, both possibilities being
intelligible:  the  very  normative  vocabulary  of  commitments  and  entitlements  refers,
indeed, to “the traditional deontic primitives of obligation and permission,” freed of the
“stigmata  they  contain  betraying  their  origin  in  a  picture  of  norms  as  resulting
exclusively from the commands or edicts of the superior, who lays an obligation on or
offer a permission to a subordinate” (1994: 160). Thus, if Brandom follows Wittgenstein in
criticizing regulism, he only changes the operative level, not the conception, of norms: if
rules are norms implicit in practice, they are still conceived as obligations, prohibitions
and permissions. It is this narrow conception of normativity, and therefore of concepts,
which  must  be  criticized  from  a  Wittgenstenian  perspective.  I  will  follow  here  V.
Descombes, who has recently argued that this Kantian reading of Wittgenstein misses the
very point of  his whole philosophy.17 This will  help us pointing out the fundamental
tactics of Wittgenstein’s pragmatism.
 
Kinds of Rules
17 According  to  Descombes,  one  cannot understand  Wittgenstein’s  discussions  on  rules
unless one sees that the main contrast orienting his philosophy, after the Tractatus, was
not the one between causal regularities and rational obligations but that between causal
and  logical  impossibilities,  or  necessities.  To  understand  this  difference,  let  us  take
Wittgenstein’s example: “it is impossible for a human being to swim across the Atlantic”
(1958: 54). Here the incompatible assertion – a human being can swim across the Atlantic
– is perfectly intelligible: as Descombes points out, the failure depends on our physical
capacities, so that “we can understand what it would mean to succeed” and even “try
one’s luck” (2007: 402) against what the assertion says it is impossible to do. This is not
the case with logical impossibilities. The “logical obstacle” is not, as Descombes says, a
“hyperphysical obstacle,” since here we do not even understand what it would mean to
overcome it: what Wittgenstein wanted to underline with this contrast was, therefore,
that  logical  impossibilities  do  not  concern  human  “finitude,”  but  the  conditions  of
“meaning” (2007: 402-3). 
18 The peculiar  nature  of  the normative  force  attached to  the logical  ‘must’  cannot  be
understood, however, unless we contrast it, furthermore, with the one attached to the
moral  ought,  at  the center of  Brandom’s Kantian framework.  Thus,  the second move
consists in further distinguishing between two kinds of rules. Logical impossibilities and
necessities belong to the domain of constitutive rules.  As Descombes says, if the logical
impossibility  is  characterized  by  “the  impossibility  of  trying  to  do  what  is  asserted
impossible,” this is because the action itself “can be understood and described only by
reference to the constitutive rules defining it” (2007: 404). Consequently, the normative
force of logic is different from that of practical rules. Indeed, as Descombes points out, a
“constitutive rule is not a commandment (a law prescribing or forbidding an action)”
(2007:  404):  commandments  belong  to  the  domain  of  regulative  rules,  which  are
understandable  only  insofar  as  two  intelligible  alternatives  are  already  there,
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independent  of  the  rule,  whereas  constitutive  rules  leave  open  only  one  intelligible
possibility, sorting out the contrary as unintelligible. 
19 This is why Descombes goes as far as to say that constitutive rules are not prescriptive.
What he means is that these rules do not say “what one ought to do (what one is obliged) to
do” but “what there is and what there isn’t (according to our institutions, our conventions)”
(2007:  405).  There is  an interesting point here about the expressive power of  normative
vocabulary. Indeed, a constitutive rule seems to be characterized by the fact of authorizing
the elimination of normative vocabulary: as Wittgenstein says in Zettel, instead of saying
“one can’t castle in draughts,” we should just say “there is no castling in draughts” (Z,
§ 134).  In  this  way,  what  seems  to  be  a  prescription  is  turned  into  a  description:  a
description of a normative fact, however, implied by the constitutive rules, as opposed to
the purely factual description presupposed by obligations and prohibitions. It is clear,
therefore,  that  the  translation from the  imperative to  the  indicative  only  works  for
someone already knowing the game.  As  Descombes acknowledges,  commenting some
remarks of Wittgenstein in The Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, when explaining
to someone the rules of our game we go back to the normative vocabulary, since we say
precisely such things as: “Here the rule says you must turn; here you may go whichever
way you like” (2007: 442).18 
20 Opposed to the realm of natural regularities, the logical must is nonetheless opposed to
obligations as constitutive rules are opposed to regulative rules. The latter points to an
independently  intelligible  behavior  as  appropriate,  sorting  out  the  contrary  as
inappropriate:  this  is  the  most  general  genus  of  a  host  of  different  practical rules  -
strategies, moral maxims, positive laws, etc. Constitutive rules are of a different nature,
since here the rule enters into the very conditions of a meaningful action. This is the
genus where we find an important kind of practical rules, “conventional necessities”: now,
as Descombes says,  when we interpret conventional  necessities and impossibilities as
obligations and prohibitions “we simply lose sight of the meaning of the institution,”
since  we  “wrongly  imagine  an  institution  as  a  natural  activity”  that  “men  try  to
domesticate”  by  “imposing  some  restrictions  to  its  free  exercise”  and  we  fail  to
understand “the constitutive or creative nature of rules when they function as rules of a
game” (2007: 407-8).
21 If Brandom is not interested in social practices based on constitutive conventional rules
creating a social world, it is because he thinks that this kind of “socially instituted norms”
cannot be our model for understanding what he calls “conceptual norms”: indeed, the
latter “incorporate objective commitments,” which contrasts with the error-free nature of
conventional  rules;  to  take  Brandom’s  example,  whatever  “the  Kwakiutl  treat  as  an
appropriate greeting gesture for their tribe, or a correctly constructed ceremonial hut, is
one; it makes no sense to suppose that they could collectively be wrong about this sort of
thing” (1994: 53). This means that in thinking of conceptual norms, Brandom has in mind
descriptive concepts  concerning  the  natural  world,  such  as  “mass”  (1994:  53),  which
essentially require the distinction between what we take as a correct application and
what is a correct application of them. As intuitive as the objectivity claim may be, it rests
on a narrow conception of concepts which parallel the narrow conception of normativity
we have just seen.
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Kinds of Concepts
22 In thinking of conventional necessities, Wittgenstein did not just want to give a logical
reading of social conventions, but also a conventional reading of logic: he was not only
explaining  the  meaning  of  social  institution,  but  the  social  institution  of  meaning.  As
Descombes points out, in thinking of the specific nature of the ‘logical must’ through the
game  analogy  Wittgenstein  wanted,  first  and  foremost,  to  reform  traditional
philosophical thinking about the nature of a priori concepts: his aim was to discard the
implicit assimilation between a priori and a posteriori propositions, leading to a reading of
logical propositions as stating “a priori facts concerning the world” (2007: 437). In place of
this, Wittgenstein underlined the function of the logical must: the “necessity” of “es muß,”
when added to a proposition, transforms it into a “norm of representation” (2007: 436)
ruling  out  in  advance  facts  that  might  contradict  it.  Thus,  the  distinction  between
constitutive and regulative rules, derived from the language game analogy, sheds light on
the very nature of cognitive concepts. If there certainly are many ways of understanding
Wittgenstein’s  conventionalism,19 the  first  step  is  to  understand the  very  distinction
between two kinds of conceptual norms. 
23 Thus, if Wittgenstein has done something in philosophy after Kant is not just to criticize
the  regulist  conception  of  rules,  at  the  basis  of  Kant’s  semantics,  but  to  clarify  the
different nature and content of concepts in light of the pluralist conception of rules we
have just seen: whereas Kant still thought of categories as regulative rules applied to a
recalcitrant  nature,  Wittgenstein  constantly  pointed  out  that  the  presuppositions  of
contentfulness, which he extended far beyond the categories of the understanding, are
best understood if we see in them a system of constitutive rules. Far from contenting
himself  with the very general  idea of  concepts  as  rules,  Wittgenstein articulated the
difference between regulative descriptive concepts and constitutive normative concepts. This is
the distinction between empirical and grammatical propositions that Wittgenstein very
often clarified by reference to the function and nature of the negation. In the Philosophical 
Investigation, for instance, he explains how the sentence “I can’t imagine the opposite of
this” must be understood, when used in connection with such claims as “only I myself can
know whether I am feeling pain”: “Of course, here ‘I can’t imagine the opposite’ doesn’t
mean: my powers of imagination are unequal to the task [compare with: swimming across
the Atlantic]. These words are a defense against something whose form makes it look like
an empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one” (PI, § 251). At the end of
the  paragraph  Wittgenstein  adds:  “((Remark  about  the  negation  of  an  a  priori
proposition)).” The general idea of a normative nature of concepts is first developed, in
Wittgenstein, to understand the specific way in which a priori propositions rule the world
by ruling empirical thought. 
24 This is Wittgenstein’s notion of grammar, as what cannot be contradicted without falling
into  meaningless  speech.  With  grammatical  propositions  we  have,  to  use  Brandom’s
vocabulary,  commitments one cannot  fail  to endorse,  unless  one still  wants  to think
something.  The right  question concerning this  kind of  commitments  cannot  concern
their entitlement.  They are constitutive  conceptual  commitments placed,  as such,  beyond
justification: being the condition of any kind of discursive practice, the question of their
being justified or not is simply meaningless. Now, this central point of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy implies  the  refusal  of  the  rationalist  framework Brandom inherited from
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Kant: indeed, if there is a structural distinction between two types of conceptual norms,
then  meaning  cannot  be  equated  with  inference,  since  the  rational  understanding
displayed in the game of giving and asking for reasons through assertions presupposes
another  kind  of  understanding,  which  concerns  the  arbitrary  conditions  of  rational
understanding. What is perhaps less obvious is to consider this central point as the heart
of Wittgenstein’s pragmatism as an overcoming of classical rationalism. For this,  it  is
necessary to see how Wittgenstein finally developed a new way of accounting for the





25 The distinction of two conceptual norms sheds a new light on the function assigned by
Wittgenstein to social  practices.  Indeed,  Wittgenstein did not  only distinguish norms
implicit in practice from rules explicit in language, but looked for those social practices
which  incorporate  the  constitutive  logical  norms  governing  the  use  of  regulative
empirical rules in language: what social practices have to account for is, in the first place,
the  tacit  conditions  of  meaningful  linguistic  exchange.  This  is  the  perspective  he
developed in On Certainty,  in  a  way that  is  particularly  interesting for  contemporary
debates  on pragmatism,  since,  in  the  context  of  a  confrontation with Moore  on the
skeptic’s challenge about knowledge’s claims, Wittgenstein clarified, as never before, the
way in which social practices are the condition of rational activity. It is the pragmatist
tactics elaborated in this text that I want to explain as a conclusion.
26 In  order  to  appease  the  skeptical  anxiety,  without  falling,  like  Moore,  in  its  trap,
Wittgenstein analyzes, in On Certainty, the ordinary functioning of assertions, especially
the use of ‘I know that.’ As he says, this explicit propositional knowledge has to be seen as
an  answer  to  a  “practical  doubt”  (OC,  § 19),  based  on  definite  reasons:  in  “normal
linguistic exchange” (OC, § 260) the expression “I know” expresses the readiness to give
“compelling grounds” in favor of  the assertion (OC,  § 243).  Now,  the skeptical  doubt
transgresses this normal functioning of  assertions, by asking reasons for any kind of
commitment.  A  regress  of  justifications  results,  which  forces  Moore,  and  all  other
philosophers, in order to answer the challenge, to look for a special kind of self-evident
knowledge:  propositional  and  yet  not  justified  by  any  reason.  Against  this  bad
foundationalist  strategy,  Wittgenstein  answers  by  questioning  the  conditions  of  a
meaningful doubt: “If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting
anything.  The  game  of  doubting  itself  presupposes  certainty”  (OC,  § 115).  To  be
intelligible, a doubt presupposes the language in which it can be expressed: therefore, it
presupposes the certainties presupposed by language. This is why a distinction must be
made between the propositional knowledge expressed through assertions and its tacit
conditions of possibility. 
27 The view Wittgenstein explicitly endorses in On Certainty is that these conditions are fixed
in and through action: “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to and
end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not
a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language
game” (OC, § 204). The supposedly self-evident knowledge is, in fact, practical know-how,
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which  does  not  follow  the  norms  of  propositional  knowledge,  since  it  governs  this
knowledge as a norm. Thus, at the fundamental level of practical certainties, one should
not say “I know that,” since this opens the unanswerable question of entitlement, but use
some grammatical indicators, disqualifying the entitlement question in advance: “It is my
unshakeable conviction that” (OC, § 103), “Nothing in the world will convince me of the
opposite”  (OC,  §  380),  “I  can’t  be  making a  mistake about  it”  (OC,  § 630),  or  simply
“Dispute about other things; this is immovable” (OC, § 655). If action lies at the bottom of
language, expressing some constitutive conceptual commitments on which the discursive
practice rests, it is because practical know-how is the point of entry in language. The child
does not learn first to think and say, through assertions, that things are thus-and-so, but
“to react in such-and-such a way; and in so reacting it doesn’t so far know anything.
Knowing only begins at a later level” (OC, § 538). The relation between mind and world is
not, to begin with, a cognitive one: what we first learn are ways of knowing how to do
things with things. This means that experience is originally organized by an intentional
behavior carrying with it the logical structure of the world. When an individual finally
come to the linguistic game which consists in an exchange of assertions, a whole system
is already established, turning around the fundamental distinction, established in and
through practice, between logical and empirical propositions: grammar is already there,
as the implicit structure of ordinary experience, the skeleton of the phenomena we talk
and deal with. 
28 In giving such a foundational role to practice Wittgenstein deeply changed his notion of
grammar.20 On Certainty proposes a functional classification of concepts, which explains the
force of the logical must by looking to the “peculiar logical role” played by some concepts
in  the  “system  of  our  empirical  propositions”  (OC,  § 136).  From  this  functionalist
perspective, even apparently empirical propositions, such as ‘I have two hands’, can play
the  logical  role  of  grammatical  propositions.  This  is  precisely  what  Wittgenstein
understood thanks to the skeptical  challenge and the bad answer of  Moore.  He thus
developed a  new conception of  logical  constitutive  rules,  structuring  thought  in  the
background: what counts is no more the content of the proposition, in any possible way,
but its place and role in a hierarchical system structured by a complementary opposition,
defined by a difference of “status” between propositions. If no proposition is intrinsically
privileged within the system, this does not mean that our beliefs form a homogeneous
system facing the tribunal of experience, as in Quine’s pragmatism: the relation between
the propositions can be “altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard
ones became fluid” (OC, § 96), but the system as such must make a structural distinction
between propositions open to “test by experience” and those functioning as a “rule for
testing”  (OC,  § 98).  The  internal  organization  of  this  intellectual  system depends  on
practice, since the genetic primacy of the practical know-how fixes its basis.  Yet this
practice is, at the same time, social. The structural organization of experience in practice
is learned in an active relation with an adult, considered as an authoritative expert: the
active “trust” that  is  necessary for a  language game to be possible at  all  (OC,  § 509)
derives from a first relation of trust from the child to some “authorities” (OC, § 493).
Thus, by taking part in some bedrock practices, the individual swallows a whole shared
“world-picture”  (OC,  § 167).  It  is  against  this  “inherited  background”  that  he  can
distinguish  between “true  and false”  (OC,  § 94),  since  it  is  only  on this  basis  that  a
meaningful exchange of assertions can take place, starting with a particular practical
doubt:  “the  questions that  we  raise  and  our  doubts depend  on  the  fact  that  some
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propositions are exempt from doubts […] like hinges on which those turn” (OC, § 341).
This is why the hierarchical system coincides with the whole of social practices.
29 Of course, just as we cannot separate the two halves of the system, we cannot separate
bedrock social practices, which deposit the first layer of beliefs as constitutive conceptual
commitments, from those linguistic social practices which enable us to play the rational
game of doubts, questions and answers, through assertions. Wittgenstein describes, in a
sketchy  way,  this  progressive  development  of  the  system  through  a  differentiated
practical learning:
The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e., it learns to act according to these
beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some
things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands
fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held
fast by what lies around. (OC, § 144)
30 In order to understand this development, and the way in which the structural distinction
within the intellectual system reflects a difference in social practices, we certainly need a
detailed description of the discursive practice, such as Brandom’s account of the game of
giving and asking for reasons, considered as a further step after bedrock social practices.
The  place,  meaning  and  functioning  of  such  discursive  practice  must  be  deeply
reconsidered once we see it through the lens of Wittgenstein’s pragmatism. Indeed, if we
take seriously the double distinction of norms and concepts as he finally elaborated it in
On Certainty, we have to admit that a more complex account is needed: in order to fully
understand  discursive  practice  as  the  articulation  of  rational  ought’s  we  have  to
understand it against the background of socially instituted constitutive norms fixing the
conditions of objectivity. A lot of substantive work is still  needed to fully have social
practices in mind.
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NOTES
1. For  this  strategy  see,  for  instance,  J.  Bouveresse,  “Le  ‘pragmatisme’  de  Wittgenstein”  in
Bouveresse (1987), and H. Putnam, “Was Wittgenstein a Pragmatist?,” in Putnam 1995.
2. Brandom has first formulated this distinction in “Pragmatics and Pragmatism,” Conant, Zeglen
2002. Putnam strongly criticized in his answer to Brandom his simplified view of the American
pragmatism. Brandom has now developed a more complex account in Brandom 2011, to which I
refer in what follows.
3. See R. Brandom, “From German Idealism to American Pragmatism – and Back,” in Brandom
2011.
4. See W. Sellars, “Some reflections on language games,” now in Sellars 2007. 
5. See also Williams (1999), ch. 6, for a similar analysis.
6. See the passage quoted in McDowell (2009: 106). 
7. For this regress argument in Brandom, see Brandom (1994: 21).
8. We also need “the teaching” (§ 197), as we will see.
9. For Brandom’s discussion of Sellars, see Brandom (1994: 26).
10. See Kripke 1982. 
11. As we will see below, the question is to know whether Wittgenstein shared Kant’s conception
of conceptual normativity or whether Brandom merges a general claim with a narrower concept
of rules and concepts derived from Kant. 
12. See Brandom (1994: 658), footnote 45. 
13. See Baker, Hacker (1984: 42). 
14. See Haugeland 1982, and Haugeland 1998.
15. See R. Brandom, “Some pragmatist themes in Hegel’s Idealism,” in Brandom (2002). 
16. See Brandom’s  discussion of  Pufendorf  and Enlightenment contract  theories  in  Brandom
(1994: 47-52).
17. See Descombes 2007. 
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18. Descombes quotes a passage from L. Wittgenstein, Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics,
Cambridge 1939, from the notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick
Smythies, edited by Cora Diamond, The University of Chicago Press, 1975, 241. 
19. For instance, in developing Wittgenstein’s view, Descombes comes curiously closer to the
instrumentalist  perspective  of  American  pragmatists.  Indeed,  according  to  him,  since  logical
norms fix the condition of cognitive activity, they cannot belong to the cognitive realm. They are
a matter of decision: just as conventions depend ultimately on what is “desirable” (2007: 408), a
priori  representations are not justified “by their conformity to an (ideal)  reality” but by our
“different practical necessities,” that is, by our “different needs” (2007: 443). This is a further
and,  in  my view,  wrong  step,  which  is  not  necessarily  implied  by  Wittgenstein’s  distinction
between two types of conceptual norms.
20. The  development  of  grammar  in  On  Certainty through  a  pragmatist  reading  of  hinge
propositions is explained in detail by D. Moyal-Sharrock 2004.
ABSTRACTS
This paper clarifies why and how Wittgenstein’s animating idea of social  practices should be
considered as expressing a fundamental pragmatist commitment.To this end, I do not take the
retrospective perspective, which traces “pragmatism” back to the criteria of use fixed by the
inventor  of  the  word,  C. S. Peirce,  but  rather  replace  Wittgenstein  in  the  context  of
contemporary  debates.  I  focus  in  particular  on  R. Brandom’s  attempt  to  understand
Wittgenstein’s second philosophy as belonging to an intellectual tradition from which his own
rationalist  pragmatism derives.  A  confrontation  follows  between  Brandom and Wittgenstein,
whose  aim  is  to  highlight  the  specific  tactics  of  Wittgenstein’s  pragmatism  as  a  refusal  of
Brandom’s  idealist  rationalism.  First,  I  present  and  defend  R.  Brandom’s  reading  of
Wittgenstein’s argument on rule-following as a decisive clarification of the general idea of social
practices. Second, I criticize Brandom’s narrow Kantian framework, explaining why it prevents
us from understanding Wittgenstein’s conception of rules and concepts, and, therefore, of the
very normativity of concepts. In light of the distinction between two kinds of conceptual norms,
empirical and grammatical, I finally show, through a reading of On certainty, that the function
assigned by Wittgenstein to social  practices  is  to account for the conditions of  possibility  of
conceptual contentfullness as expressed in rational activity.
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